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ABSTRACT
 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
 
address serious deficiencies in the ba.nkruptcy system. The
 
previous system was criticized for appearances of
 
impropriety in bankruptcy proceedings, lack of creditor
 
control over administration of cases, and the court's joint
 
administrative and adjudicative functions. The United
 
States Trustee program was created by Congress to address
 
these issues by providing administrative and oversight
 
functions in the bankruptcy system. This paper analyzes the
 
effectiveness of the program by conducting a review of the
 
substance of the Bankruptcy Act and an examination of the
 
Bankruptcy Code to determine if the problems it sought to
 
correct are continuing. The United States Trustee program
 
is found to be effective and has achieved its program
 
objectives. Conclusions and recommendations are made to
 
further strengthen the program and bankruptcy system.
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
 
grants authority to the federal gpvernment to make uniform
 
laws on the subject of bankruptcy. Pursuant to this
 
authority. Congress had regulated bankruptcies in the United
 
States through a succession of statutes until 1978, when it
 
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA).
 
The BRA has five bankruptcy chapters: Chapter 7
 
(liquidation); chapter 9 (municipal); chapter 11 (business
 
reorganization); chapter 12 (family farmer reorganization);
 
and chapter 13 (individual reorganization). An appointed
 
trustee in chapter 7 cases administers any assets for the
 
benefit of creditors. Chapters 11, 12, and 13, require the
 
debtor to submit a "plan" to repay creditors, over a period
 
of time, all or a portion of the creditor's claim.
 
Although bankruptcy is intended to give the debtor a
 
"fresh start," the effect is generally detrimental to
 
creditors, particularly creditors of "no-asset" chapter 7
 
debtors wherein a general discharge of debts is granted and
 
the creditors receive no monies.
 
Prior to the BRA, all administrative as well as
 
judicial functions in bankruptcy were handled by the
 
bankruptcy courts. The administrative functions in
 
bankruptcy cases include the following: ensuring payment of
 
withholding and other taxes by bankrupt debtors, organizing
 
and scheduling meetings of creditors, organizing creditor
 
committees, appointing private trustees in chapter 7
 
liquidation and chapter 13 wage-earner cases, monitoring the
 
filing of reports and schedules, and monitoring cases for
 
signs of fraud and abuse. Judicial functions were generally
 
limited to rulings by judges on disputed matters in
 
adversary proceedings and on other filings for which court
 
approval is required.
 
The conflictive nature of handling both administrative
 
and judicial functions by the bankruptcy courts caused
 
public confidence in the system to wane. An awkward
 
relationship between trustees and their appointing judges
 
created an appearance of favoritism, cronyism and bias.
 
The BRA created the United States Trustee (UST) pilot
 
program and housed it in the executive branch within the
 
Department of Justice (DOJ). The purpose of the program was
 
to separate the administrative duties from the judicial
 
functions in the bankruptcy system. The pilot program
 
originally was to run through 1984 but was extended to 1986.
 
As part of the legislation establishing the pilot
 
program. Congress mandated that a formal eyaluation of it be
 
conducted and a formal recommendation was to be made by the
 
Attorney General conGferning the desitability of nationwide
 
This paper will analyze the effectiveness of the UST
 
program under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. This will
 
be accomplished by considering prior studies and reviewing
 
major parts of the program. A review of the substance of
 
the Bankruptcy Act and an examination of the Bankruptcy Code
 
will be conducted to determine if the problems it sought to
 
correct are continuing. Recommendations will be made as
 
necessary or appropriate.
 
CHAPTER II
 
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION
 
Introduction
 
The current bankruptcy system was established by the
 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 during the early years of consumer
 
and commercial credit and was designed primarily to handle
 
business casesJ The rise in consumer credit after World
 
War II brought a corresponding increase in the number of
 
consumer bankruptcy cases.
 
District judges referred bankruptcy cases to
 
"referees," who were appointed to two year terms and paid on
 
a commission basis. The judicial role of the referee was
 
minor; most litigation was handled by federal district or
 
state courts. They were perceived to be a supervisor or
 
administrator. Three types of matters were decided by
 
referees: (1) those relating to property over which they had
 
direct control; (2) those referred to them as special
 
''Three other "Bankruptcy Acts" preceded the Bankruptcy
 
Act of 1898: (1) The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (repealed in
 
1803) allowed involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against
 
merchants; (2) the Bankruptcv Act of 1841 (repealed in 1843)
 
allowed voluntary or involuntary proceedings against
 
merchants or individuals; (3) the Bankruptcy Act of 1867
 
(repealed in 1878) allowed corporations to file bankruptcy.
 
masters by district judges; (3) those submitted to them by
 
consent of the parties.
 
The Chandler Act of 1938 and subsequent legislation
 
gave the referee increasing judicial responsibilities and
 
powers, and transferred many administrative duties to a
 
trustee or clerk, in 1946, referees were made salaried
 
officers of the district courts and their term of office was
 
extended to six years. By legislation enacted in 1966,
 
referees were prohibited from acting as trustees or
 
receivers in bankruptcy cases.
 
in 1973, on the recommendation of the Judicial
 
Conference, the title "referee" was changed to "bankruptcy
 
judge. This distinctipn recognized bankruptcy judges as
 
official judicial officers who handle only bankruptcy cases;
 
bankruptcy courts became a specialized court within the
 
district court system. The district judges, then, became
 
less involved with the administration and decision-making in
 
bankruptcy cases, which they considered to be too
 
specialized to be handled on a generalist basis. The only
 
control district judges still retained was in the
 
appointment and removal of bankruptcy judge process, in
 
^Advisory Committee's [on Bankruptcy Rules established in
 
1960 pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, sec. 331] Introductory Notes
 
to the Preliminary Draft [of the Bankruptcy Rules and Official
 
Forms promulgated in 1973], contained in 1976 Collier Pamphlet
 
Edition. Bankruotcv Act and Rules. Part 2 Bankruptcy Rules,
 
edited by Lawrence P. King, Asa S. Herzog, and William T.
 
Laube. (New York: Mathew Bender, 1976), p. 753.
 
hearing appeals of bankruptcy court decisions,^ and in the
 
exercise of certain powers reserved to the district courts
 
by statute.
 
Prior to the BRA, bankruptcy judges administered the
 
bankruptcy system including individual bankruptcy cases.
 
These administrative, supervisory and clerical functions
 
were in addition to their judicial duties. In contrast to
 
most civil litigation, where case administration and
 
supervision is handled by the litigants, the judge in a
 
bankruptcy case takes an active role in the supervision of
 
cases. In bankruptcy cases there is a definite public
 
interest in this method of administration due to the
 
potential for fraud, self-dealing, and diversion of funds.^
 
Additionally, bankruptcy cases have the potential for
 
affecting hundreds of creditors, thereby necessitating the
 
active supervision by an impartial person. The Bankruptcv
 
^While district court generally retains the power to hear
 
bankruptcy appeals, an intermediate appeals court has been
 
established (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel) which, unless an
 
objection to jurisdiction has been filed by the parties, may
 
hear appeals from the bankruptcy court. If an objection is
 
filed, then the appeal is transferred for hearing to district
 
court. "The judicial council of a circuit may establish a
 
bankruptcy appellate panel, comprised of bankruptcy judges
 
from districts within the circuit, to hear and determine, upon
 
the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a)
 
of this section." Bankruptcv Reform Act. U.S. Code, 28, sec.
 
158(b)(1).
 
^U.S., Congress, House, Hearings on H. Rept. 31 and
 
H. Rept. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civil and
 
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
 
94th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1975-76, pt. 1, pp. 99-101.
 
Act of 1898 (Act) was designed so that creditors had control
 
over the "bankrupt's"^ estate,^ which theoretically belbnged
 
to them. Under the Act, creditors elected a "trustee" tb
 
oversee the assets for the benefit of the creditors. They
 
were also permitted to elect a committee to represent them
 
in matters pertaining to the administration of the case as
 
well as in the supervision of the trustee, in reality,
 
however, creditor control existed only in the largest cases
 
and trustee supervision was done by bankruptcy judges. In
 
cases where the creditors refused to exercise their
 
supervisory powers, the judge was forced to do so by
 
appointing a trustee. The judge supervised the trustees and
 
advised them on legal methods to recover assets, reviewed
 
most of the trustee's transactions, and ruled "ex parte"^ on
 
their propriety. Additionally, the judge presided at the
 
first meeting of creditors and supervised the examinations
 
® The term "bankrupt," denoting the person(s) who filed
 
bankruptcy, was changed to "debtor" with the enactment of the
 
Bankruptcv Reform Act of 1978.
 
^ The term "estate" is synonymous with "assets" of the
 
person who has filed bankruptcy. The "estate" or "assets" of
 
a debtor come under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
 
and are subject to distribution to creditors under the
 
supervision of the court, generally through a trustee
 
appointed by the creditors or by the court.
 
^"Ex parte" is defined as an oral or written
 
communication between the court and a party in interest to an
 
action (the trustee in this instance) which is not made on the
 
public record and to which reasonable prior notice to all
 
parties has not been given.
 
of the debtors (similar to depositions) which were conducted
 
by the trustee and creditors to obtain information regarding
 
the debtor and the estate.
 
In 1973, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
 
United States (Bankruptcy Commission) recommended
 
legislation that was introduced in both houses of Congress.
 
The legislation would separate administrative and
 
adjudicative functions: a bankruptcy court (judicial) and
 
an executive agency (administrative) to be called the United
 
States Bankruptcy Administration.
 
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted an
 
alternative bill that proposed the transfer of non-judicial
 
or administrative duties to bankruptcy clerks and to the
 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). The
 
National Bankruptcy Conference drafted a third bill that
 
combined elements of the bills recommended by the Bankruptcy
 
Commission and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.
 
After 3 years of hearings, the Bankruptcv Reform Act of 1978
 
was passed.® The UST program was created as a result of
 
this compromise; it provided that it be instituted as a
 
pilot program under the supervision of the Attorney General.
 
®The substantive portion of the Act is Title I, also
 
known as the Bankruptcv Code.
 
Problems Before the United States Trustee Program
 
Inconsistencies between the judicial and administrative
 
roles of bankruptcy judges placed them in a position of
 
conflict. Specifically questioned was their ability to act
 
impartially in disputes between the estate and third
 
parties.
 
The trustee, an appointee of the bankruptcy judge,
 
represented the estate. The same trustee also may have
 
represented many other estates before the same judge who
 
also appointed him to other cases. A close working
 
relationship generally ensued with frequent "ex parte"
 
contacts between the two in the administration of the case.
 
The appearance of impartiality was thus impugned.
 
Information obtained during an examination of the
 
debtor at the first meeting of creditors, over which the
 
bankruptcy judge presided, may then have been used in
 
actions later filed by the trustee on the advice of the
 
judge. The judge became an "interested party" and therefore
 
biased about a case.
 
Creditor control of estates, as envisioned by the
 
framers of the Act, was in reality a myth. The asset case
 
was controlled, not by creditors, but by attorneys; the
 
bankruptcy system operating more for the benefit of
 
attorneys than for the benefit of creditors. The attorneys
 
solicited and obtained proxies from creditors and thus
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gained control over the supervision of the case and assets.
 
In areas where trustees were appointed by the judges, the
 
trustee also administered the cases. Again, the
 
relationship between the trustee and the judge was
 
questioned.
 
Fee generation was another problem. The Act's
 
administrative system provided for trustee compensation in
 
the form of fees to be collected from an estate as an
 
incentive for trustees to collect assets for the estate. If
 
the trustee also served as receiver, additional fees were
 
received even if the work done was part of the work of the
 
trustee. Legislation allowed a fee structure, which was
 
abused, and further allowed the trustee to receive most if
 
not all of the monies from the estate while the creditors
 
received nothing. The assets were applied to the trustee's
 
fee, his attorney's fee, and the required contribution to
 
the Referees Salary and Expense Fund.
 
The general practices grow from the relationship
 
between the trustees and the bankruptcy judges.
 
The Bankruptcy Act permits election of trustees by
 
creditors. Creditors seldom take an interest in
 
consumer cases, however, and thus the bankruptcy
 
judges appoint their friends as trustees in the
 
Vast majority of cases. Thus, litigants and
 
observers frequently object to the apparent, and
 
in many cases real, Oronyism between bankruptcy
 
judges and their trustees. The "bankruptcy ring"
 
is reflected not only in the appearance of
 
unfairness in bankruptcy judges ruling in
 
litigation between their appointees and third
 
parties, but also in the awarding of compensation
 
by the appointing authority. The judges protect
 
their appointees, mostly through use of the $150
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disGretlonary fee, to the detriment of both the
 
debtor's fresh start and the creditors' recovery.9
 
Last, there was a problem related to the relationship
 
between bankruptcy judges and the bankruptcy bar, especially
 
attorneys representing debtors and trustees. The multitude
 
of contacts between these led to a consensus among non-

bankruptcy attorneys that there was a "bankruptcy ring" that
 
had ah inside track on all bankruptcy matters, including
 
judicial favoritism. This was reported by Harold Marsh,
 
Chairman of the Bankruptcy Commission in hearings before the
 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights:
 
As a result of the nature of the system itself,
 
there exists a relationship between the Bankruptcy
 
Judges, the trustees and the counsel for the
 
trustees which many people, including many
 
involved in the system, consider unhealthy from
 
the point of view of proper judicial and
 
governmental administration. The judges by and
 
large appoint the trustees and thereby in effect
 
select the counsel. They do not generally appoint
 
persons who are total strangers to them, and it
 
would be entirely unrealistic to expect that they
 
would or should. These same trustees and lawyers
 
then deal on a day-to-day basis with the judge
 
regarding the routine conduct of the
 
proceeding,and finally these same trustees and
 
lawyers appear before the judge as litigants and
 
counsel when a controversy arises.
 
As a result of the conditions discussed above,
 
and I am sure for other reasons, there grew up
 
over the years an isolation of the bankruptcy
 
bench and bar from the mainstream of American
 
jurisprudence and from the judiciary and the legal
 
fraternity generally. Persons practicing in the
 
bankruptcy field tended to confine their
 
'u.S., Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary,
 
Bankruptcv Law Revision. H. Rept. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
 
1977, pt. 1, p. 538.
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activities exclusively to that area, and the
 
Bankruptcy Court, of course, did so from
 
necessity. Therefore, a relatively small group of
 
lawyers controlled the bankruptcy field. Those
 
not within this group tended to regard them with
 
suspicion and distrust. I believe that in the
 
last ten years there may be some evidence that
 
this "separate but unequal" status of the
 
bankruptcy lawyers is being eliminated to some
 
extent; but when the bar associations discuss one
 
of their favorite new subjects, that of
 
"specialization," the first thing that everyone
 
agrees upon is that bankruptcy can be labeled a
 
"specialty," although thereafter consensus
 
immediately disappears. There is no real reason
 
for this other than a historical one.
 
The problems caused by the combination of the
 
administrative and judicial responsibility for a case, the
 
lack of true creditor control, and the cronyism of the
 
"bankruptcy ring" were not new. The Bankruptcy Commission
 
documented them in detail.
 
Previous Studies
 
Other studies of the bankruptcy system were made that
 
also recommended a separate agency to administer the
 
bankruptcy caseload. The first major study of the system
 
was done by William J. Donovan for the United States
 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
 
Brookinqs Report (1968) was furnished by a task force from
 
^''u.S., Congress, House, Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
 
of the United States, Report of the Commission on the
 
Bankruptcv Laws of the United States. H. Rept. 93-137, 93rd
 
Cong., 1st sess., 1973.
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Brookings Institution. The Comitiission on the Bankruptcy
 
Laws of the United States was established by Public Law 91­
354 and existed from July 24, 1970, to July 30, 1973. It
 
conducted 8 days of public hearings and 44 days of executive
 
sessions.
 
Donovan Report
 
The Donovan Report (1929) was the first major study of
 
the bankruptcy system in the United States. It was headed
 
by William J. Donovan for the United States District Court
 
for the Soutliern District of New York. The report indicated
 
that ijankruptcy law administration was characterized by
 
serious abuses and malpractice on the part of attorneys,
 
receivers, trustees, appraisers, custodians, auctioneers,
 
and other persons and associations. The conditions were
 
caused by two main features of the Act:
 
1) Slow-moving procedural machinery laid down by the
 
Act; • " •
 
2) The theory underlying the administrative structure
 
of the Act (creditor control), was not working and the
 
actual administrative functions were being handled by court
 
controlled administrators.
 
The report stated that there was no agency to study the
 
major problems of administration and there was no uniformity
 
of practice. It concluded that the matters required study
 
on a national scale which could be accomplished only by a
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federal executive agency. The report recoitiinended creation
 
of a federal bankruptcy commissioner to license and
 
supervise trustees; investigate complaints against trustees
 
and abuses in administration; make rules and coordinate the
 
System; compile statistics, data, and make studies and
 
reports; establish bureaus to examine and
 
supervise transactions in nominal and no-asset cases. It
 
was suggested that these changes would Separate the judicial
 
functions from the administrative ones and vest the
 
administrative functighs in the commissioner.
 
As a result of the Donovan Report. changes were
 
proposed in the system to solve these problems and to make
 
the bankruptcy system more efficient and fairer. Although
 
the estates would still use private trustees, a government
 
official would supervise bankruptcy administration, thereby
 
ensuring fair and efficient administration.
 
Brookinas Report
 
A task force to study bankruptcy administration was
 
created in 1968 by the Brookings Institution. Its report,
 
published in 1971, pronounced the current system a failure
 
and recommended elimination of the courts and, in their
 
David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth. Bankruptcy:
 
Problem. Process, Reform. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
 
Institution, 1971).
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place, establishment of an independent executive agency to
 
handle bankruptcy cases The report stated:
 
The total bankruptcy system gets its job done
 
according to the literal requirements of the law,
 
but it is a dreary, costly, slow, and unproductive
 
process. Compared to what the system might be
 
doing, the present reality is a shabby and
 
indifferent effort.
 
Management by coalition of referees,
 
trustees, and the bankruptcy bar which is of
 
little benefit to debtors, creditors,or the
 
public. Management characterized by loose
 
supervision, infrequent field examinations, little
 
concern for qualifications of personnel, archaic
 
procedures, high costs, and unwarranted delays.
 
These shortcomings are a natural result of
 
using a judicial system to try to solve problems
 
that are by nature administrative. The judicial
 
system relies on adversary procedure and on judges
 
who are for the most part not highly skilled in
 
the supervision of bankruptcy matters or in the
 
selection of expert referees.
 
Commission on Bankruptcv Laws of the United States
 
Congress began hearings on bankruptcy in 1968 and
 
created the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
 
States (Bankruptcy Commission) in 1970. The purpose of the
 
commission was to study, analyze, and recommend changes in
 
the bankruptcy laws. Submitted to Congress in 1973, the
 
report recommended a separation of judicial and
 
administrative functions by the formation of a bankruptcy
 
court with expanded jurisdiction to handle judicial
 
^^Corporate reorganizations were to be filed and
 
administered exclusively by district courts.
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functions and an executive agency (United States Bankruptcy
 
Administration) to perform administrative functions.
 
Conclusion
 
The common conclusion reached in the Donovan Report,
 
the Brookinqs Report, and the Bankruptcy Commission report
 
was that there was no agency equipped to handle increasingly
 
complex bankruptcy cases. They recommended that a separate
 
agency be created to handle administration of the bankruptcy
 
system.
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CHAPTER III
 
PILOT PROGRAM
 
Introduction
 
Section 408 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
 
established a United States Trustee pilot program that
 
became effective on October 1, 1979 (see Appendix I). The
 
program, housed within the Department of Justice, was under
 
the jurisdiction of the Attorney General (see Appendix II).
 
The Attorney General formulated standards for panels of
 
private trustees and standing trustees as required by title
 
11 of the legislation.
 
The U.S. Trustee, rather than the court, in a
 
pilot district will...supervise administration of
 
bankruptcy cases and exercise any other function
 
prescribed by the Attorney General, such as
 
presiding at first meetings of creditors, related
 
to bankruptcy administration....The main purpose
 
of the U.S. trustee is to remove administrative
 
duties from the bankruptcy judge leaving the
 
bankruptcy judge free to resolve disputes
 
untainted by knowledge of matters unnecessary to a
 
judicial determination.^^
 
For courts not involved in the pilot study, the
 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO)
 
performed comparable functions. Non-pilot districts
 
^^U.S., Congress, House, Representative Edwards speaking
 
on Introducing the House Amendments to the Senate Amendments
 
to H. Rept. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 20 September, 1977,
 
Congressional Record. 124: H11089.
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established a panel of trustees who Were to act under the
 
supervision of the AO. Administrative functions were
 
handled by "estate administrators," employed by the
 
bankruptcy clerk's office. The estate administrator system,
 
however, lacked the staffing allocation and authority that
 
the UST was given, which resulted in a lower level of case
 
administration in non-pilot districts.
 
The pilot program consisted of an Executive Office for
 
United States Trustees and 10 field offices (and necessary
 
satellite offices) headed by United States Trustees. Of the
 
94 judicial districts, 18 were included in the program.
 
Organization of the United States Trustee Program
 
The UST program, which consisted of 10 field offices
 
covering 18 judicial districts throughout the United States,
 
became effective the date of the Bankruptcy Code: October 1,
 
1979. It began as a five year pilot program under the
 
United States Department of Justice. The newly enacted
 
chapter 39 to title 28 of the United States Code, entitled
 
"United States trustees," established the office of UST and
 
prescribed duties, salaries, and miscellaneous provisions
 
for governance; These provisions are modeled after the
 
United States Attorney system.
 
The Executive Office for the United States Trustees was
 
established in Washington, D.C. and is headed by an
 
executive directof, who is appointed by the United States
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Attorney General. The Director provides policy direction,
 
coordination, legal counsel, and administrative support to
 
the individual United States trustees on behalf of the
 
Attorney General.
 
By way of the Bankruptcv Judges. United States
 
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcv Act of 1986. the
 
program became permanent and nationwide. With two states
 
excepted, the Act created 21 regions, each with a UST who
 
is appointed by the Attorney General to a 5 year term. The
 
trustee is subject to removal by the Attorney General. It
 
also allowed the appointment of Assistant United States
 
Trustees as necessary. Although, the program is self-funded
 
from fees collected in various cases (see Appendix III),
 
actual fundihg of tha program is determined by cpngressional
 
appropriation. During the 1990 fiscal year, approximately
 
$60 million was allocated to the program for the maintenance
 
and operation of 88 regional offices and 800 personnel 15
 
''^Alabama (11th Gircuit) and North Carolina (4th Circuit)
 
judicial districts opted out of the program. They are to
 
become part of the program at the earlier of: (1) an election
 
by a majority of the bankruptcy judges of such judicial
 
district which chooses to be included in a bankruptcy region
 
established under 28 U.S. Code, sec. 581(a), or (2) October
 
1, 1992. Bankruptcv Judges. United States Trustees and Family
 
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Statutes at Large 100: 3088
 
(1986).:
 
^-Edward M. Melillo, "The Organization and Role of the
 
United States Trustee Under the Bankruptcy Code," California
 
Bankruptcv Journal. (California Bankruptcy Forum, Vol. 18 No.
 
4, 1990), p. 366.
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Role of the United States Trustee
 
The UST monitors all trustees and cases under chapters
 
If 11, 12 and 13. Congress established this office to be
 
"bankruptcy watchdogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty and
 
overreaching in the bankruptcy arena..." to "...relieve
 
bankruptcy judges of their current administrative and
 
supervisory role...become the principal administrative
 
officers of the bankruptcy system." They are not intended
 
to serve as an extension of the court system, but rather as
 
having a separate and distinct role and duty to execute and
 
enforce the bankruptcy laws; to be responsible for
 
supervising the day to day administration of bankruptcy
 
cases to insure that the intent and requirements of the
 
Bankrubtcv Code are being met. Various regional and
 
satellite offices monitor trustees and analyze their cases
 
on a continuous basis, as reguired by the Code, through use
 
of a computerized case management system that both logs and
 
indexes regional bankruptcy filings and can give access to
 
case information from other regions.
 
Chapter 7 Cases
 
As provided for under the Bankruptcv Code. the UST
 
maintains and supervises a panel of private individuals to
 
serve as interim trustees in chapter 7 cases; these must
 
meet all qualifications established by the attorney general
 
(see Appendix IV). The interim trustee liquidates the non­
20
 
exempt, unencumbered assets of the debtor. Chapter 7
 
debtors (individuais) receivd discharges of their rion­
dischargeable debts and thus receive their financial "fresh
 
start." The chapter 7 business/dorporate debtor does not
 
receive a discharge; rather, the business assets are
 
liguidated and the case is closed.
 
Interim trustees must be bonded in an amount determined
 
by the regional UST's office. All chapter 7 trustees are
 
required to submit semi-ahnual reports to the UST for their
 
judicial district. These reports must summarize no-asset
 
cases and provide an itemized breakdown of asset cases. The
 
reports on asset cases include property values,
 
encumbrances, sales, expenses and liquid assets; exemptions
 
and property abandonments for both asset and non-asset cases
 
are included. Chapter 7 trustees are audited by the Office
 
of the inspector General, DOJ Audit Staff. Information from
 
audits (which includes operational surveys, cash management
 
reviews and compliance inspections) is used to identify
 
internal control weaknesses in the individual trustee's case
 
administration or cash management practices.
 
Chapter 11 Cases
 
In chapter 11 business reorganization cases, the debtor
 
remains in possession of and continues to operate the
 
business. Occasionally, and upon court order, a trustee is
 
appointed in lieu of the debtor-in-possession. Under this
 
21
 
chapter, the debt and equity of the debtor can be
 
restructured through a plan of reorganization, which is
 
subject to approval by creditors and the court. Upon
 
confirmation of the plan, chapter 11 provides a framework
 
for its implementation.
 
The UST of each district assigns an attorney and an
 
analyst (employees of the UST) to monitor the progress of
 
the district's chapter 11 cases. The UST solicits an
 
"official creditors' committee"^^ shortly after the case is
 
filed. This committee oversees the reorganization of the
 
debtor and brings matters to the attention of the UST the
 
committee deems necessary. The UST (as represented by his
 
attorney) meets with the debtor and counsel to discuss
 
aspects of the case such as the reason(s) for the filing;
 
the financial eondition and management of the debtor; the
 
prospects for reorganization; and the operating and
 
reporting requirements. In addition to required interim
 
reporting, the debtor is also required to pay quarterly fees
 
to the UST, which are then submitted to the executive office
 
to fund the program. In most "confirmed" chapter 11 cases,
 
the debtor remains in control of the business with oversight
 
^"^The "official creditors' committee" consists of the
 
twenty largest unsecured creditors of a chapter 11 debtor.
 
The committee is appointed by the UST as soon as three or more
 
qualified creditors express a willingness to serve.
 
Additional members of the committee are solicited from
 
creditors at the first meeting of creditors.
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by a creditors' committee (if any) and the UST; however, in
 
some instances a chapter 11 trustee or receiver is appointed
 
where there is cause.
 
Chapter 13 Cases
 
Chapter 13 requires that an individual have a regular
 
source of income with which to propose a plan that will pay
 
all or a portion of their debts over a period of time (not
 
to exceed 60 months). This plan is subject to approval by
 
creditors, the standing trustee, and the court.
 
The UST appoints a chapter 13 standing trustee for each
 
region who is subject to qualifications similar to those
 
required of the chapter 7 trustee. A bond is required for
 
each in an amount equal to or greater than 150 percent of
 
the total monthly average of all bank balances in the
 
standing trustee's bank accounts, including the expense
 
account. Audits are conducted annually by the Office of the
 
Inspector General, DOJ Audit Staff, or by an independent
 
accounting firm. Additionally, chapter 13 trustees are
 
required to submit an annual report and budget for review by
 
the UST.
 
^^"Cause" may be actions by the debtor-in-possession such
 
as misappropriation of funds, failure to maintain insurance,
 
or to pay taxes and salaries.
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chapter 12 Cases
 
Chapter 12 is restricted to "family fainners." The UST
 
appoints a standing trustee to oversee cases that are
 
handled in a manner similar to chapter 13­
Other Functions
 
In addition to the appointment of trustees and
 
oversight of bankruptcy case administration and trustees,
 
the trsT has the following responsibilities:
 
1) The UST authorizes financial institutions to hold
 
deposits for debtors and trustees. These institutions must
 
provide quarterly banking and collateralization reports to
 
the UST showing the amount of liquid assets on deposit for
 
each debtor account, the type(s) of account(s), and the
 
amount of excess funds over $100,000 held for each debtor.
 
2) The UST may participate in actions for relief,
 
which may be heard on any issue relating to trustee
 
responsibilities in a case under the Code. These actions
 
may be motions to dismiss or convert a case, to appoint a
 
trustee or receiver, to object to the discharge of a debtor,
 
or to other appropriate relief. Because it Was the intent
 
of Congress that the UST play an active role in cases under
 
the Bankruptcv Code. many courts have held that the UST
 
should be granted party-in-interest status for all
 
administrative responsibilities.
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 3) The UST becomes involved in "bad faith" bankruptcy
 
case filings/® and/or where bankruptcy crimes^' may have
 
been committed. Such violations and crimes are reported to
 
the UST who then refers the matter to the United States
 
Attorney or other law enforcement agencies.
 
Conclusion
 
The BRA required the Attorney General to conduct a
 
study of the pilot program during the transition period, and
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annually thereafter, and report his findings to Congress.
 
The section contained a "sunset" provision that would
 
abolish the pilot program as well as the Administrative
 
Office counterpart in the DOJ effective April 1, 1984,
 
assuming Congress refused to extend the UST program.
 
^®"Bad faith" filings consist of multiple filings by a
 
debtor; transfers of property to avoid pending court action;
 
refiling in violation of a previous court order; seeking a
 
discharge of debts within 6 years of a prior discharge;
 
attempts to discharge primarily consumer debts under chapter
 
7 that could be paid through a chapter 13 plan.
 
^'Bankruptcy "crimes" include the concealment or transfer
 
of estate assets; perjury; failure to disclose ownership and
 
transfers of real property of an estate; providing false
 
information on the bankruptcy petition and schedules; and
 
fraud.
 
^°"Not later than January 3, 1984, the Attorney General
 
shall report to the Congress, to the President, and the
 
Judicial Conference of the United States, as to the
 
feasibility, projected annual cost and effectiveness of the
 
United States trustee system, as determined on the basis of
 
the studies and surveys respecting the operations...together
 
with recommendations as to the desirability and method of
 
proceeding with implementation..in all judicial districts of
 
the United States." Bankruotcv Reform Act of 1978. Statutes
 
at Large 92; 2549 (1978).
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Due to a controversy involving the jurisdiction and
 
power of bankruptcy judges, the pilot program was extended
 
twice with the second extension ending September 30, 1986.
 
Passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
 
Act of 1984 resolved the controversy and allowed further
 
consideration of the UST program.
 
"There has been a continuing tension and adjustment
 
between the strictures of Article III of the Constitution,
 
which requires that judges of the federal courts be appointed
 
for life ('good behavior') and the need for more federal
 
judges/arbiters/referees/ magistrates. Appointments for life
 
have the partial advantage of political insulation; however,
 
senility, disability, expense and lack of responsiveness are
 
only a few of the disadvantages. When Congress passed the
 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. the bankruptcy judges were to
 
receive 14-year terms and to be restricted in their exercise
 
of jurisdiction to cases and controversies arising in or
 
related to bankruptcy cases. The jurisdictional grant was too
 
expansive to survive an Article III violation challenge, and
 
a badly divided Supreme Court found in its plurality decision
 
in the Marathon rNorthern Pipeline Construction Company v.
 
Marathon Pipe Line Company. 459 U.S. 1094 (1982)] case that
 
the Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional if the bankruptcy
 
judges had only Article I (term of years) status. Rather than
 
have its decision result in chaos, the Supreme Court took the
 
unusual step of staying its order so that Congress could
 
either elevate the bankruptcy judges to Article III judges or
 
prune back the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to
 
something resembling old summary jurisdiction under the
 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. After two extensions. Congress
 
finally adopted the latter course, but the system is still
 
unstable." Hon. David N. Naugle, United States Bankruptcy
 
Judge, San Bernardino, California, Interview on April 19,
 
1991.
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CHAPTER IV
 
EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM
 
Introduction
 
The 1978 statute mandated that an evaluation of the
 
pilot program be conducted, and it further directed that the
 
DOJ report to Congress, the President, and the Judicial
 
Conference of the United States no later than January 3,
 
1984, on the effectiveness of the United States trustee
 
system and the desirability and method of proceeding with
 
full implementation in all judicial districts. The
 
evaluation was intended to address the following questions:
 
1) Has the UST system been successful in accomplishing
 
its objectives?
 
2) Are there any alternatives to the UST system that
 
could do as well or better at accomplishing the
 
objectives?
 
3) What modifications to the UST system might improve
 
its effectiveness?
 
4) How cost-effective is the current pilot program,
 
and what would be the costs of nationwide expansion?
 
Abt Associates Evaluation (1983)
 
The statutorily mandated study and evaluation of the
 
pilot program was done by an independent consulting firm.
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 Abt Associates. Its report, forwarded to Congress by the
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Attorney General, strongly supports the pilot program.
 
The study compared bankruptcy administration in pilot
 
districts to districts that did not have United States
 
trustees. It concluded that the program was sound in theory
 
and that it demonstrated its effectiveness empirically.
 
The evaluation design had two components:
 
1) Qualitative data were collected in 11 pilot
 
and 9 non-pilot districts through: (a) examination
 
of local rules, policy statements, manuals, and
 
other written materials; (b) in-depth interviews
 
with UST and clerk's office staff; (c) interviews
 
with judges, trustees, and other members of the
 
bankruptcy community. The qualitative component
 
addressed case administration in the three primary
 
chapters of the Code: 11, 7, and 13.
 
2) Quantitative data were gathered by examining
 
the court dockets and case files of approximately
 
1,500 cases selected from 18 matched pairs of
 
pilot and non-pilot districts. The cases were
 
randomly sampled from those filed during the year
 
ending June 30, 1981. Three types of cases were
 
sampled: chapter 11 cases; chapter 7 voluntary
 
consumer cases; and chapter 7 business or
 
involuntary cases.
 
Summarv of results
 
Results of the Abt study are organized around the
 
research questions addressed by the evaluation as follows:
 
^^Nancy L. Ames, Lindsey D. Stellwagen, and Ralph T.
 
Jones, An Evaluation of the U.S. Trustee Pilot Program for
 
Bankruptcv Administration: Findings and Recommendations.
 
Cambridge: Abt Associates. 1983.
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1. Has the United States trustee system been successful in
 
accomplishing its objectives?
 
Abt found that in both concept and practice, the
 
UST system achieves its goals. To assure unbiased and
 
efficient processing of bankruptcy cases, separation of
 
administration and judicial functions is essential.
 
Through active monitoring of cases by the trustee
 
system, interests of creditors are being met.
 
Additionally, the system's "watch-dog" monitoring of
 
attorney's fees has helped prevent excessive fees and
 
poor representation of debtors by the bar.
 
The program is found to encourage, rather than
 
discourage, participation of creditors in case
 
administration (creditors committees in chapter 11
 
cases, for example). The trustee, considered to be a
 
disinterested party, can be representative of parallel
 
public interests.
 
The program is not duplicative of functions
 
performed by the clerks' office, nor is it another
 
bureaucratic"layer" in the bankruptcy system. Some
 
"overlap" in the duties of the UST, the court, and the
 
clerks' office, particularly in chapter 7 case
 
administration, was found. This overlap is considered
 
to be minimal and easily rectified; it is considered to
 
be important as a "check and balance" in the system.
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In short, as envisioned by the legislative
 
framers, the program serves a crucial role in
 
bankruptcy administration—a role that is
 
neither excessively duplicative nor
 
unnecessarily expansive.
 
The report listed the primary functions of the UST
 
program and its findings as to whether or not those
 
functions had been satisfied. They are as follows:
 
A) Monitor the debtor-in-possession in chapter 11
 
business reorganization cases and to take appropriate
 
action as necessary.
 
Finding: While both United States trustees in
 
pilot districts and estate administrators in non-

pilot districts consider efficient case monitoring
 
and case administration to be a high priority, the
 
level of both monitoring and case administration
 
was significantly higher in the pilot districts
 
and resulted in a higher percentage of confirmed
 
plans and a lower level of cases showing no
 
activity.
 
B) Establish, maintain, and supervise panels of
 
private trustees responsible for chapter 7 case
 
administration.
 
Finding: Due to budgetary cutbacks in 1981 within
 
the UST program and concomitant reduction in
 
staffing, case monitoring was focused on asset
 
chapter 7 cases. Non-pilot districts also placed
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chapter 7's at a lower level of priority; routine
 
administration was performed in the clerk's
 
office. Pilot districts, however, provided more
 
training, advice, and supervision to panel
 
trustees than did non-pilot districts.
 
Additionally, both the UST and the court review
 
panel trustees fee applications and bank
 
statements. The UST may remove the panel trustees
 
for inadequate performance. Estate administrators
 
in non-pilot districts do not have removal
 
authority.
 
C) Appoint and supervise standing trustees who
 
are responsible for chapter 13 case administration.
 
Finding; Low priority is given by the UST to
 
monitoring chapter 13 standing trustees because of
 
limited funding. The decision was made when the
 
pilot program was commenced to concentrate
 
resources on chapter 11 and chapter 7 cases.
 
Estate administrators in non-pilot districts
 
concentrate on chapter 11 and chapter 7 cases
 
also, so few differences were found in the two
 
programs. The differences that were found in
 
administration were due to variances in local
 
rules and policies rather than to the involvement
 
of the UST. Pilot districts received more
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support, auditing, and monitoring of legal fees
 
and fraudulent practices than did non-pilot
 
districts.
 
2. Are there alternatives to the UST system that could do
 
as well or better at accomplishing objectives?
 
The study found that the UST trustee program is
 
superior to the estate administrator system.
 
Additional recommendations are made as to the "seating"
 
of the system. The options considered are: the
 
clerk's office; a new independent or quasi-independent
 
agency; the DOJ; another executive agency.
 
A) The UST system is preferable to estate
 
administrators for the following reasons:
 
1) Location of estate admihistrators within
 
the clerks' office does not support the
 
desired separation of administrative and;
 
judicial functions;
 
2) The estate administrator system lacks the
 
staff, resources, and authority to function
 
as the UST does.
 
B) Housing the program in a new independent or
 
quasi-independent agency would be costly and may
 
subject the program to elimination because of
 
federal budget cuts and/or changes in the
 
political environment.
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C) To achieve the goal of separation of judicial
 
and administrative functions, an estate
 
administrator-type system must be completely
 
independent of the court. Maintaining the system
 
within the DOJ is recommended for the following
 
reasons:
 
1) It maintains continuity of management,
 
policy direction, budgetary planning, and
 
experience.
 
2) Potential conflicts of interest between
 
the DOJ (advocate of the government) and the
 
UST (impartial case administrator) have not
 
occurred.
 
3) The pilot program has been effective
 
while housed in the DOJ.
 
4) The legislative intent for placing the
 
pilot program in the DOJ still applies.^^
 
3. What modifications to the UST System might improve its
 
effectiveness?
 
^^Drafters of the bankruptcy legislation cited the
 
following reasons for seating the UST program within the
 
Department of Justice: (1) lawyers are readily available who
 
understand the Bankruptcv Code and UST mandate; (2) authority
 
to coordinate support between the UST's and the United States
 
attorneys; (3) prestige to attract qualified USTVs; (4) there
 
was in place, within the Department of Justice, an agency with
 
an organizational model (United States Attorney's office)
 
similar to the one recommended for the UST program (3-tiered
 
organizational structure with a central/executive office,
 
regional offices and local/satellite offices).
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Expansion of the program is recommended. Modifications
 
are suggested for improved case administration.
 
A) Intensified monitoring of cases, development
 
of standard specifications for financial reports,
 
and increased use of debtor and creditor
 
conferences are needed for chapter 11 cases.
 
B) Refinements to the current chapter 7 case
 
administration system, such as increased
 
uniformity of forms, policies and procedures;
 
limiting panel trustee membership so that
 
individual annual caseload is 200-250; reassessing
 
trustee fee structure; instituting an IRS-type
 
audit of debtors.
 
C) Variability throughout judicial districts is
 
cited as a problem in chapter 13 case
 
administration. It is recommended that there be
 
increased guidance and standardization in case
 
processing.
 
In addition to chapter specific recommendations,
 
computerized case management and delineation of
 
responsibilities between the trustee and bankruptcy
 
court to reduce overlap are recommended.
 
4. How cost-effective is the current pilot program, and
 
what would be the costs of nationwide expansion?
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An analysis was done of the amount of pilot
 
program funds allocated to offices and functions;
 
percentage of funds for personnel versus non-personnel
 
items; office staffing patterns; and office resources
 
adjusted for caseload.
 
Assuming sufficient staff to provide the same
 
level of service and a similar regional office model
 
within the clerk's office as proposed for the UST
 
program, it is estimated that start-up costs for the
 
estate administration system would be 20 million
 
dollars for the first year of operation and 19 million
 
dollars for the second.
 
Cost estimates for the expanded UST program are
 
24.2 million dollars for the first year and 23 million
 
dollars for the second. These figures assume that the
 
program would maintain its current functions and
 
priorities; be housed within the DOJ; and have the same
 
3—tiered organizational structure.
 
Study findings show significant differences in
 
efficient case administration between pilot and non-

pilot districts. The increased case administration
 
efficiency in the pilot districts combined with the
 
necessity of administrative and judicial independence
 
outweigh the cost savings of implementing an estate
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administrator program within the Administrative Office
 
of the United States courts.
 
Summarv of Recommendations
 
The 1983 Abt Associates study recommended that the UST
 
Program be expanded and implemented on a nationwide basis.
 
It recommended further that the program remain in the DOJ
 
and expressly recommended that it not be placed within the
 
judiciary (under the control of the Administrative Office of
 
the United States Courts) as this would
 
in many ways threaten the independence from the
 
judiciary that was originally sought in creating
 
the U.S. Trustee Program....An association between
 
the court and the U.S. trustee's office, even if
 
loosely structured, would hinder both the
 
independent operation of each and the public

perception of independence.^^
 
A 3-tiered, regionally structured organization for the
 
program is recommended to minimize costs and maximize
 
continuity with the current pilot program. Preservation of
 
integrity within the bankruptcy system as well as efficient
 
and effective case management justify the costs involved in
 
the implementation of the expanded United States trustee
 
program.
 
Abt Associates Evaluation Update ClSBSl
 
Because of the delay caused by the controversy in
 
Northern Pipeline Construction Companv. Congress required an
 
update on the information in the 1983 Abt Associates study.
 
^^Ames et al., p. 258.
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The first study was based on data from 20 pilot and non-

pilot districts; 6 pilot and 5 non-pilot districts were used
 
by Abt Associates in the update.
 
Chapter 11 cases
 
The update found that the UST program made a
 
significant difference in the administration of chapter 11
 
cases by aggressively monitoring debtofs-in-posSession and
 
taking remedial action when debtors fail to meet their
 
responsibilities. There has been improvement in the
 
supervision of the chapter 13 standing trustees in pilot
 
districts. This has been done by monitoring budgets^
 
standardizing audit procedures, and improving administrative
 
efficiency. Administration of chapter 7 cases is highly
 
variable among districts and panel trustees; however, policy
 
guidelines have been established that govern the employment
 
of professionals, the abandonment of assets, and the
 
investment of estate funds. Steps have been taken to ensure
 
fiscal accountability through standardized financial
 
reporting and random audits of panel trustees.
 
Supporting the prior study. United States trustees
 
continue to be more active than estate administrators in
 
monitoring chapter 11 cases. The study identified 2 areas
 
with significant progress: monitoring both the financial
 
position of the debtor-in-possession and the payment of
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post-petition taxes. Additionally, the trustee was more
 
likely to take action where cases were not progressing.
 
Chapter 7
 
The original study critiGized the lack of uniformity
 
among districts and trustees in case administration and
 
liquidation of estate assets in chapter 7 cases. Although
 
some progress has been made, the 1985 study suggests further
 
strengthening in chapter 7 case administration.
 
Chapter 13 cases
 
Monitoring of chapter 13 cases continues to be of low
 
priority in both pilot and non-pilot districts. Substantial
 
variation in case administration by standing chapter 13
 
trustees remains, due in part to varying judicial standards
 
in confirming chapter 13 plans, caseload size, availability
 
of automation/coinputers and state tax laws. Some progress
 
has been made in the area of strengthened audit
 
procedures, automation, and monitoring of chapter 13
 
standing trustee expenditures' Additipnally, the Executive
 
Office of the UST has allotted a staff person to coordinate
 
the chapter 13 program.
 
^^Such actions include motions before the court for
 
dismissal of a casP or conversion to chapter 7 when a plan of
 
reorganization has not been timely filed or confirmed.
 
^^An on-site audit is performed by either a national
 
accounting firm (for trustee's annual receipts exceeding
 
$250,000) or by the Department of Justice for standing
 
trustees not subject to audit by the national accounting firm.
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other Functions
 
The pilot districts have been more successful than non-

pilot districts in fulfilling other functions: general
 
"watchdog"; (2) promoting standardization; (3) encouraging
 
automation. The estate administration system's weaknesses
 
in these areas are due primarily to lack of personnel;
 
budgetary restrictions; lack of prestige and authority with
 
attorneys; location within the clerk's office; variability
 
among districts' policies and procedures; lack of authority
 
to take remedial action when debtors-in-possession fail to
 
meet their responsibilities.^^
 
Alternatives
 
The alternative to the UST program is the estate
 
administration system being used in non-pilot districts.
 
Although deputy clerks have generally performed their
 
function well, the disadvantages, as above-cited, warrant
 
placement of the trustee system outside the judiciary.
 
Recommendations
 
The 1985 update to the Abt Associates 1983 evaluation
 
supports nationwide expansion of the UST program. Current
 
recommendations parallel ones made in the original report.
 
^^The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Guam
 
Restaurant v. Soeciner further reinforced the lack of standing
 
of the clerk's office by prohibiting sua sponte action by the
 
court.
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1. Housing the program
 
To guarantee separation of administrative and
 
judicial functions, the program should remain
 
housed in the United States DOJ rather than in the
 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
 
Housing it in the DOJ allows continuity of the
 
program, management, policy direction, staff, and
 
budgeting. Potential conflicts of interest
 
between the DOJ as an advocate for the United
 
States government and the UST as impartial case
 
administrator have not materialized. The UST
 
program has been effective in this location (DOJ)
 
and has the staff, prestige, authority, and
 
organizational model (United States Attorney) to
 
fulfill the legislative intent of the bankruptcy
 
program.
 
2. 	Organizational structure for the UST program
 
Continuation of the 3-tiered organizational
 
structure is recommended. This consists of;
 
a) a central/executive office, headed by an
 
executive officer, to provide policy
 
guidance, supervision, and budget management;
 
b) regional offices, headed by United States
 
trustees, to coordinate functions within a
 
district; monitor activities of local
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offices; provide coordination and support;
 
and screen and select assistant United States
 
trustees;
 
c) local offices, headed by Assistant United
 
states trustees, to monitor and administer
 
caseload within local areas.
 
Personnel resources
 
The 1983 evaluation contained a detailed cost
 
and resource analysis for nationwide expansion of
 
the UST program. A replication of this analysis
 
was considered to be beyond the scope of this
 
study. Some recommendations, however, were
 
proffered should the program be expanded.
 
A) Seven year appointments by the Attorney
 
General of the UST with assistant UST
 
positions to be by merit rather than
 
appointment;
 
B) An increase in salary for lawyers and
 
financial analysts in the UST offices to
 
recruit and retain qualified staff;
 
C) Currently, there are no statutory
 
restrictions for removal from a trustee
 
panel; recommend "for cause" restriction aS
 
it is for removal of a trustee from a case;
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D) A term of membership, with staggered
 
terms, for panel trustees is recommended to
 
ensure continuity and experience on the
 
panel.
 
Other modifications
 
Further modifications to the UST trustee
 
system are recommended to make the expanded
 
program more effective and efficient.
 
A) Chapter 11 cases
 
1) increase the use of conferences with
 
debtors and creditors;
 
2) intensify monitoring so that
 
remedial action is taken in a timely
 
manner;
 
3) clarify statutes on the standing of
 
the UST to take remedial action and
 
advise on matters concerning the
 
adequacy of disclosure statements and
 
plans.
 
B) Chapter 7 cases
 
Two alternative approaches for case
 
administration are recommended:
 
1) Refine the current system by:
 
a) fully implementing existing
 
policy directives;
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b) continuing with and expanding
 
current efforts to standardize
 
trustee reports and monitoring
 
trustee performance;
 
c) introducing an IRS-type audit of
 
debtors.
 
2) Allow in-house administration of
 
small and no-asset cases (less than $500
 
of non-exempt, unencumbered assets) 28 by
 
the UST office. This option would
 
entail no additional cost to the
 
government as the cost of an in-house
 
attorney would be offset by the "per
 
case" fee that is paid to panel
 
trustees. Advantages of in-house
 
administration include increased
 
efficiency, aggressive pursuit of small
 
assets, and improved public perception
 
of the bankruptcy system. Field testing
 
of this option is recommended.
 
^^This is not allowed under the statute. The UST may
 
serve as a trustee in a case "where no one is willing to
 
serve" under Section 15701(b) of the Code. A broad
 
interpretation may allow administration by the UST on a case­
by-case basis.
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C) Chapter 13 cases
 
Continued auditing and monitoring
 
of fees and administrative expenses of
 
the standing trustees is recommended.
 
They should he encouraged to reduce fees
 
when possible. Additionally, the UST
 
should encourage and assist the standing
 
trustees in stream-lining Chapter 13
 
case administration.
 
Conclusion
 
The conclusions reached in the original Abt Associates
 
evaluation were reaffirmed in the August, 1985, update of
 
the original study. The update evaluation of the UST pilot
 
program found it to be sound theoretically and effective
 
empirically. The program maintained its strength in
 
chapter 11 case administration, continued to make
 
recommendations for improvements in chapter 7 case
 
administration, and realized improved effectiveness in
 
chapter 13 case administration. Additionally, it
 
contributed to the efficiency and integrity of the
 
bankruptcy system. Nationwide expansion of the program was
 
recommended by both the 1983 Abt Associates evaluation and
 
the 1985 Abt Associates update.
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CHAPTER V
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The main purpose of the United States trustee system is
 
to separate the administrative from the judicial functions
 
of the court. This "separatism" addressed criticisms of the
 
former bankruptcy system (prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
 
of 19781. Those criticisms were as follows:
 
1) The combination of administrative and judicial
 
responsibility for a case;
 
2) Lack of true creditor control;
 
3) Cronyism of the "bankruptcy ring."
 
The solution to these criticisms appeared to be a
 
combination of professionalization, oversight, financial
 
security, and classical separation of powers.
 
with passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. a
 
UST pilot program was established to provide administrative
 
and oversight functions to the bankruptcy system while
 
leaving adjudicative matters to bankruptcy judges. This
 
placed judicial functions within the judicial branch and
 
"watchdog" and administrative functions within the executive
 
branch.
 
The reguirements of the Attorney General for appoint
 
ment of United States Trustees ensured professionalization
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(See AppendiJi IV). Employment of panel and standing
 
trustees is done by the office of the UST instead of by the
 
court, thereby removing the appearance of "cronyism" with
 
the court. Monitoring and auditing of panel and standing
 
trustees, as well as establishing guidelines, policies aind
 
procedures provide further evidence of separation from the
 
court of administrative functions.
 
Creditor control in chapter 11 cases has been regained
 
through use and encouragement by the UST of creditors'
 
committeeis. Additionally, iitigation for the benefit of the
 
estate (thus the creditors) can be initiated by the UST.
 
Such actions can gain assets for the estate, thereby
 
benefitting creditors.
 
Further oversight and participation by the UST is
 
needed in day-to-day chapter 11 case administration.
 
According to the Abt reports, there are significantly more
 
chapter 11 cases with confirmed plans of reorganization in
 
pilot districts than there are in non-pilot districts.
 
Current policy causes monitoring of cases by the UST to
 
cease after plan confirmation when regular payments are to
 
be made to creditors and taxing agencies. With no oversight
 
during this post-confirmation period, there is no
 
accountabi1ity for plan payments by the "reconstituted"
 
debtor. Remedial action must come from the court's
 
involvement in administrative oversight of the case wherein
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the matter is brought to the attention of the bankruptcy
 
judge, who then requests action on the part of the UST.
 
Procedurally, the UST is not required to take action since
 
the case has a confirmed plan. Therein lies the conflict:
 
Is the judge entering the administrative arena and through
 
"ex parte" communication requiring or suggesting action from
 
the bankruptcy "watchdog"?
 
It is recommended that further standardization of
 
policies, procedures, and forms be established within the
 
court. Currently, each district has its own forms and local
 
rules and procedures; the guidelines for the requirements of
 
the UST differ in each district. This can be viewed as
 
confusing and inequitable to the bankruptcy bar.
 
Appearances of cronyism have been repotted fcy bar members
 
who are not familiar with local procedure and who are
 
faulted for failing to follow the local rules. Local
 
practitioners, meanwhile, appear to have easier access to
 
the bench.
 
Additional refinements in policy are needed regarding
 
the dollar amount of assets in an estate that cause a
 
chapter 7 trustee to declare it a "no-asset" case. Panel
 
trustees within a district self-determine what constitutes
 
an asset versus a no-asset case; many times the ease with
 
which the asset may be realized for the estate is the
 
determining factor. While one trustee may set $500.00 as
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the iniriimuTn to be realized for an asset case, another
 
trustee may establish $100,000.00 as the: criterion.
 
CertainlY this lack of an established guideline may lead to
 
enrichment for one estate and enrichment of one trustee in
 
another case. Creditors may realize nothing from an estate
 
while the trustee absorbs the assets to pay his "costs of
 
administration." Additional auditing of fees and expenses
 
claimed by standing and panel trustees is advised to ensure
 
accountability.
 
Upon expansion of the UST program, trustees appointed
 
under the old system (by the judges) had the option to be
 
"re-employed" as panel trustees under the supervision of the
 
UST. Auditing the records of these "re-employed" trustees
 
is recommended in cases assigned to them prior to UST
 
supervision.^' While the UST is actively and aggressively
 
cohfrOnting this issue, more action may be necessary.
 
The lack of adequate personnel to accomplish these
 
recommendations, as well as recommendations made in the Abt
 
reports, continues to be a problem. Although the UST
 
program is self-funding, the program is subject to
 
limitations imposed by the appropriations process.
 
The enormous increase in bankruptcy filings and
 
concomitant detrimental effect on numerous creditors
 
^'a case pending in the Northern District of California
 
involves a "court appointed" trustee, for alleged fraudulent
 
actions and misappropriation of estate funds.
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requires immediate attention to the bankruptcy system. The
 
establishment of the UST program appears to have a positive
 
effect on the administration of the system, but budgetary
 
priorities must be reevaluated.
 
Further standardization of policies and procedures
 
within the bankruptcy system and UST program is necessary.
 
Additionally, automation and computerization is essential.
 
Currently there are pilot districts undergoing automation,
 
but many courts are so large that the programs are unable to
 
handle the caseload. With automation comes the ability to
 
audit the bankruptcy system more accurately, something noted
 
in the Abt reports. While the UST program has an
 
automation system that allows for case monitoring, the
 
courts do not have the capability to do so and must rely on
 
other personnel to oversee case administration.
 
Overall, the UST program (in effect nationwide for 5
 
years) has proven to be an effective and cost efficient
 
means of monitoring and overseeing bankruptcy case
 
administration. Evaluation of the current program would be
 
valuable in discovering and assessing problem areas within
 
the system. Further Congressional action and legislation
 
may be required to strengthen and refine both the UST
 
program and the bankruptcy system.
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APPENDIX I: 28 United States Code, Section 581
 
United States trustees,
 
(a) The Attorney General shall appoint one United
 
States trustee for each of the following regions composed of
 
Federal judicial districts (without regard to section 451);
 
(1) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
 
Rhode Island,
 
(2) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
 
(3) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
 
(4) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
 
Virginia, and West Virginia and for the District of
 
Columbia.
 
(5) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Louisiana and Mississippi.
 
(6) The Northern District of Texas and the
 
Eastern District of Texas.
 
(7) The Southern District of Texas and the
 
Western District of Texas.
 
(8) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Kentucky and Tennessee.
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(9) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Michigan and Ohio.
 
(10) The Central District of Illinois and the
 
Southern District of Illinois; and the judicial
 
districts established for the State of Indiana.
 
(11) The Northern District of Illinois; and the
 
judicial districts established for the State of
 
Wisconsin.
 
(12) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, and South
 
Dakota.
 
(13) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Arkansas, Nebraska, and Missouri.
 
(14) The District of Arizona.
 
(15) The Southern District of California; and the
 
judicial districts established for the State of Hawaii;
 
and for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern
 
Mariana Islands.
 
(16) The Central District of California.
 
(17) The Eastern District of California and the
 
)
 
Northern District of California; and the judicial
 
district established for the State of Nevada.
 
(18) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Alaska, Idaho (exclusive of Yellowstone
 
National Park), Montana (exclusive of Yellowstone
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National Park), Oregon, and Washington.
 
(19) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Colorado, Utah,and Wyoming (including those
 
portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in the
 
States of Montana and Idaho).
 
(20) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
 
(21) The judicial districts established for the
 
States of Alabama, Florida, ad Georgia and for the
 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of
 
the United States.
 
(b) Each United States trustee shall be appointed for
 
a term of five years. On the expiration of his term, a
 
United States trustee shall continue to perform the duties
 
of his office until his successor is appointed and
 
qualifies.
 
(c) Each United States trustee is subject to removal
 
by the Attorney General.
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APPENDIX II: 28 United States Code, Section 586
 
Duties; supervision by Attorney General.
 
(A) Eacli united States trustee^ within the region for
 
which such United States trustee is appointed, shall—
 
(1) establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of
 
private trustees that are eligible and available to
 
serve as trustees in cases under chapter 7 of title 11;
 
(2) serve as and perform the duties of a trustee
 
in a case under title 11 when reguired under title 11
 
to serve as trustee in such a case;
 
(3) supervise the administration of cases and
 
trustees in cases under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of title
 
11 by, whenever the United States trustee considers it
 
■ 	 to be appropriate— 
(A) monitoring applications for compensation
 
and reimbursement filed under section 330 of title
 
11 and, whenever the United States trustee deems
 
it to be appropriate, filing with the court
 
comments with respect to any of such applications;
 
(B) monitoring plans and disclosure
 
statements filed in cases under chapter 11 of
 
title 11 and filing with the court, in connection
 
with hearings under sections 1125 and 1128 of such
 
title, comments with respect to such plans and
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disclosure statements;
 
(C) laonitoring plans filed under chapters 12
 
and 13 of title 11 and filing with the court, in
 
connection with hearings under sections 1224,
 
1229, 1324, and 1329 of such title, comments with
 
respect to such plans;
 
(D) taking such action as the United States
 
trustee deems to be appropriate to ensure that all
 
reports, schedules, and fees required to be filed
 
under title 11 and this title by the debtor are
 
properly and timely filed;
 
(E) monitoring creditors* committees
 
appointed under title 11;
 
(F) notifying the appropriate United States
 
attorney of matters which relate to the occurrence
 
of any action which may constitute a crime under
 
the laws of the United States and, on the request
 
of the United States attorney, assisting the
 
United States attorney in carrying out
 
prosecutions based on such action;
 
(G) monitoring the progress of cases under
 
title 11 and taking such actions as the United
 
States trustee deems to be appropriate to prevent
 
undue delay in such progress; and
 
(H) monitoring applications filed under
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section 327 of title 11 and, whenever the United
 
States trustee deems it to be appropriate, filing
 
with the court comments with respect to the
 
approval of such applications;
 
(4) deposit or invest under section 345 of title
 
11 money received as trustee in cases under title 11;
 
(5) perform the duties prescribed for the United
 
States trustee under title 11 and this title, and such
 
duties consistent with title 11 and this title as the
 
Attorney General may prescribe; and
 
(6) make such reports as the Attorney General
 
directs.
 
(b) If the number of cases under chapter 12 or 13 of
 
title 11 commenced in a particular region so warrants, the
 
United States trustee for such region may, subject to the
 
approval of the Attorney General, appoint one or more
 
individuals to serve as standing trustee, or designate one
 
or more assistant United States trustees to serve in cases
 
under such chapter. The United States trustee for such
 
region shall supervise any such individual appointed as
 
standing trustee in the performance of the duties of
 
standing trustee.
 
(c) Each United States trustee shall be under the
 
general supervision of the Attorney General, who shall
 
provide general coordination and assistance to the United
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States trustees.
 
(d) The Attorney General shall prescribe by rule
 
qualifications for membership on the panels established by
 
United States trustees under paragraph (a)(1) of this
 
section, and qualifications for appointment under subsection
 
(b) of this section to serve as standing trustee in cases
 
under chapter 12 or 13 of title 11. The Attorney General
 
may not require that an individual be an attorney in order
 
to qualify for appointment under subsection (b) of this
 
section to serve as standing trustee in cases under chapter
 
12 or 13 of title 11.
 
(e)(1) The Attorney General, after consultation
 
with a United States trustee that has appointed an
 
individual under subsection (b) of this section to
 
serve as standing trustee in cases under chapter 12 or
 
13 of title 11, shall fix—
 
(A) a maximum annual compensation for such
 
individual, not to exceed the annual rate of basic
 
pay in effect for step 1 of grade GS-16 of the
 
General Schedule prescribed under section 5332 of
 
title 5; and
 
(B) a percentage fee not to exceed—•
 
(i) in the case of a debtor who is not
 
a family farmer, ten percent; or
 
(ii) in the case of a debtor who is a
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family farmer, the sum of
 
(I) not to exceed ten percent of
 
the payments made under the plan of such
 
debtor, with respect to payments in an
 
aggregate amount not to exceed $450,000;
 
and
 
(II) three percent of payments
 
made under the plan of such debtor, with
 
respect to payments made after the
 
aggregate amount of payments made under
 
the plan exceeds $450,000;
 
based on such maximum annual compensation and the
 
actual, necessary expenses incurred by such individual
 
as standing trustee.
 
(2) Such individual shall collect such
 
percentage fee from all payments received by such
 
individual under plans in the cases under chapter
 
12 or 13 of title 11 for which such individual
 
serves as standing trustee. Such individual shall
 
pay to the United States trustee, and the United
 
States trustee shall deposit in the United States
 
Trustee System Fund-—
 
(A) any amount by which the actual
 
compensation of such individual exceeds 5 per
 
centum upon all payments received under plans
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in cases under chapter 12 or 13 of title 11 
for which such individual serves as standing 
;trustee; and' ■ 
(B) any amount by which the percentage
 
for all such cases exceeds—
 
(i) such individual's actual
 
compensation for such cases, as adjusted
 
under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1);
 
(ii) the actual, necessary
 
expenses incurred by such individual as
 
standing trustee in such cases. Subject
 
to the approval of the Attorney General,
 
any or all of the interest earned from
 
the deposit of payments under plans by
 
such individual may be utilized to pay
 
actual, necessary expenses without
 
regard to the percentage limitation
 
contained in subparagraph (d)(1)(B) of
 
this section.
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APPENDIX III: 28 United States Code, Section 589(a)
 
United States Trustee System Fund
 
(a) There is hereby established in the Treasury
 
of the United States a special fund to be known as the
 
"United States Trustee System Fund" (hereinafter in
 
this section referred to as the "Fund"). Monies in the
 
Fund shall be available to the Attorney General without
 
fiscal year limitation in such amounts as may be
 
specified in appropriations Acts for the following
 
purposes in connection with the operations of United
 
States trustees—
 
(1) salaries and related employee benefits;
 
(2) travel and transportation;
 
(3) rental of space;
 
(4) communication, utilities, and
 
miscellaneous computer charges;
 
(5) security investigations and audits;
 
(6) supplies, books, and other materials for
 
legal research;
 
(7) furniture and equipment;
 
(8) miscellaneous services, including those
 
obtained by contract; and
 
(9) printing.
 
(b) There shall be deposited in the Fund-­
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(1) one-third of the fees collected under
 
section 1930(a)(1) of this title;
 
(2) three-fifths of the fees collected under
 
section 1930(a)(3) of this title;
 
(3) one-half of the fees collected under
 
section 1930(a)(4) of this title;
 
(4) one-half of the fees collected under
 
section 1930(a)(5);
 
(5) all of the fees collected under section
 
1930(a)(6) of this title;
 
(6) three-fourths of the fees collected
 
under the last sentence of section 1930(a) of this
 
title; and
 
(7) the compensation of trustees received
 
under section 330(d) of title 11 by the clerks of
 
the bankruptcy courts.
 
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
 
amounts in the Fund which are not currently needed for
 
the purposes specified in subsection (a) shall be kept
 
on deposit or invested in obligations of,or guaranteed
 
by, the United States.
 
(2) On November 1, 1989, and on November 1 of
 
each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury
 
shall transfer into the general fund of the Treasury
 
the amount, if any, in the Fund that exceeds 110
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percent of­
(A) the amount appropriated for the entire
 
current fiscal year for the purposes specified in
 
subsection (a), or
 
(B) if no appropriation has been made for
 
the entire current fiscal year, the annual
 
equivalent of the aggregate amount appropriated to
 
date for the current fiscal year for the purposes
 
specified in subsection (a).
 
(d)(1) The Attorney General shall transmit to the
 
Congress, not later than 120 days after the end of each
 
fiscal year, a detailed report on the amounts deposited
 
in the Fund and a description of the expenditures made
 
under this section.
 
(2) If for each fiscal year in any period of 2
 
successive fiscal years—
 
(A) the aggregate amount deposited under
 
subsection (b) in the Fund exceeds 110 percent of
 
expenditures for the purposes specified in
 
subsection (a),or
 
(B) the costs incurred for the purposes
 
specified in subsection (a) exceed the aggregate
 
amount deposited under subsection (b) in the Fund,
 
then the Attorney General shall include in such
 
report a recommendation regarding the manner in
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which the fees payable under section 1930(a) of
 
title 28, United States Code, may be modified to
 
cause the annual amount deposited in the Fund to
 
more closely approximate the annual amount
 
expended from the Fund.
 
(e) There are authorized to be appropriated to
 
the Fund for any fiscal year such sums as may be
 
necessary toisupplement amounts deposited under
 
subsection (b) for the purposes specified in subsection
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APPENDIX IV: 28 United States Code, Sections 509 and 510
 
Qiialifications were established by the Attorney General
 
(by authority vested in him by 28 United States Code
 
sections 509 and 510) for membership on panels of private
 
trustees who are eligible to serve 7 trustees and
 
as standing trustees in chapter 13.
 
Section 58.3 of Chapter I of Title 28, Code of Federal
 
Regulations reads:
 
Oualifications for Membership on Panels of Private Trustees
 
(a) To be eligible for appointment to the panel
 
and to retain eligibility therefor, an individual must
 
pbsisess the qualifications described in paragraph (b)
 
of this section in addition to any other statutory
 
qualifications. A corporation or partnership may
 
qualify as an entity for appointment to the private
 
panel. However, each person who, in the opinion of the
 
United States Trustee or of the Director, performs
 
duties as trustee on behalf of a corporation or
 
partnership must individually meet the standards
 
described in paragraph (b) of this section, except that
 
each United States Trustee, with the approval of the
 
Director, shall have the discretion to waive the
 
applicability of subparagraph (b)(6) of this section as
 
to any individual in a non-supervisory position. No
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professional corporation, partnership, or similar
 
entity organized for the practice of law or accounting
 
shall be eligible to serve on the panel.
 
(b) The qualifications for membership on the
 
panel are as follows:
 
(1) Possess integrity and good moral
 
character.
 
(2) Be physically and mentally able to
 
satisfactorily perform a trustee's duties.
 
(3) Be courteous and accessible to all
 
parties with reasonable inquiries or comments
 
about a case for which such individual is serving
 
as private trustee.
 
(4) Be free of prejudices against any
 
individual, entity, or group of individuals or
 
entities which would interfere with unbiased
 
performance of a trustee's duties.
 
(5) Not be related by affinity or
 
consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to
 
any employee of the Executive Office for United
 
States Trustees of the Department of Justice, or
 
to any employee of the office of the United States
 
Trustee for the district in which he or she is
 
applying.
 
(6)(i) Be a member in good standing of the
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bar of the highest court of a state or of the
 
District of Columbia;:OR
 
(ii) Be a certified public accountant; OR
 
(iii) Hold a bachelor's degree from a
 
full four-year course of study (or the equivalent)
 
of an accredited college or university (accredited
 
as described in Part II, § III of Handbook X118
 
promulgated by the United States Office of
 
Personnel Management) with a major in a business-

related field of study or at least 20 semester-

hours of business-related courses; or hold a
 
master's or doctoral degree in a business-related
 
field of study from a college or university of the
 
type described above; OR
 
(iv) Be a senior law student or candidate
 
for a master's degree in business administration
 
recommended by the relevant law school or business
 
school dean and working under the direct
 
supervision of:
 
(A) a member of a law school faculty;
 
^ ' or
 
(B) a member of the panel of private
 
trustees; or
 
(C) a member of a program established
 
by the local bar association to provide
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clinical experience to students; OR
 
(v) Have equivalent experience as deemed
 
acceptable by the United States Trustee.
 
(7) Be willing to provide reports as
 
required by the United States Trustee.
 
(8) Have submitted an application under
 
oath, in the form prescribed by the Director, to
 
the United States Trustee for the District in
 
which appointment is sought, provided that this
 
provision may be waived by the United States
 
Trustee on approval of the Director.
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